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Secure physical layer network coding versus secure
network coding
Masahito Hayashi, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—Secure network coding realizes the secrecy of the
message when the message is transmitted via noiseless network
and a part of edges or a part of intermediate nodes are
eavesdropped. In this framework, if the channels of the network
has noise, we apply the error correction to noisy channel before
applying the secure network coding. In contrast, secure physical
layer network coding is a method to securely transmit a message
by a combination of coding operation on nodes when the network
is given as a set of noisy channels. In this paper, we give several
examples of network, in which, secure physical layer network
coding has advantage over secure network coding.
Index Terms—secrecy analysis, secure communication, noisy
channel, network coding, computation and forward, physical
layer security
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure network coding is a method to securely transmit
the message via noiseless network when a part of edges or
a part of intermediate nodes are eavesdropped [1], [2], [3],
[4], [5], [6]. Since the real channel has noise, we apply the
error correction to the real channel. Then, we apply secure
network coding to the noiseless channel realized by error
correction. That is, in the above scenario, we separately apply
the error correction and secure network coding. Therefore,
there is a possibility that we have an advantage by jointly
applying the error correction and secure network coding. This
idea is called physical network coding [7], [8], [9]. That is,
to consider this improvement for the security, we discuss
the secure version of physical layer network coding, i.e.,
secure physical layer network coding, which is a method
to securely transmit a message by a combination of coding
operation on nodes when the network is given as a set of
noisy channels. There are two kinds of codes in secure physical
layer network coding. Once we have secure network coding,
we can attach physical layer network coding. This method
can be considered as a simple combination of secure network
coding and physical layer network coding. The other type of
codes in secure physical layer network coding are codes that
cannot be made by such a simple combination. Unfortunately,
there are almost no studies for secure physical layer network
coding of the latter type. That is, existing studies addressed
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only secure computation-and-forward, which is a method to
securely transmit the modulo sum of two input message when
noisy multiple access channel is given [10], [11], [12], [13],
[14], [15]. The motivation of these studies is the realization
of secure two way-relay channel with untrusted relay. To seek
the further possibility of secure physical layer network coding,
we need to find more examples of concrete coding schemes
of secure physical layer network coding.
In fact, secure network code mainly focuses on the secrecy
for the attack to channels. Some typical secure network codes
cannot realize the secrecy when one of intermediate nodes
is eavesdropped. In contrast, secure physical layer network
coding is advantageous for attacks on intermediate nodes. In
this paper, we give two examples of network, in which, secure
physical layer network coding realizes a performance that
cannot be realized by secure network coding. One is butterfly
network [16] and the other is a network with three source
nodes.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows.
Section II reviews the results of secure computation-and-
forward, which is a typical example of secure physical layer
network coding. Section III discusses secure communication
over butterfly network by using secure physical layer network
coding. Section IV addresses secure communication over a
network with three source nodes by using secure physical layer
network coding.
II. SECURE COMPUTATION-AND-FORWARD
First, we review secure computation-and-forward. We con-
sider secure computation-and-forward in a typical setting.
Consider two senders V1, V2 and one receiver R. Assume that
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Fig. 1. Computation-and-forward.
2the sender Vi has message Mi ∈ Fq , and the receiver R are
linked by a (noisy) multiple access channel that has two inputs
from the two senders V1 and V2. Computation-and-forward is
the task for the receiver R to obtain the modulo sum M1 +M2
via the (noisy) multiple access channel as Fig. 1.
To discuss computation-and-forward, many papers focused
on a multiple access Gaussian channel. When the sender Vi
sends the complex-valued signal Xi for i = 1, 2, the receiver
R receives the complex-valued signal Y as
Y = h1X1 + h2X2 + Z, (1)
where h1, h2 ∈ C are the channel fading coefficients, and Z
is a Gaussian complex random variable with average 0 and
variance 1. In the following of this section, we assume multiple
use of the above multiple access Gaussian channel.
Using lattice codes, the papers [17], [18], [19] derived an
achievable rate under the energy constraint, which is called
the computation rate. Also, based on the BPSK scheme, in
which Xi is coded to (−1)
Ai with Ai ∈ F2, the paper [20]
derived an achievable rate I(Y ; A1+A2)Eq.(1), where the mutual
information is given with the independent and uniform random
numbers A1 and A2. In this paper, we choose the base of
logarithm to be e. Then, the papers [21], [22] proposed to use
LDPC codes (regular LDPC codes and spatial coupling LDPC
codes) with the BPSK scheme. The method proposed by [21],
[22] can be efficiently realized, and realizes a rate close to
I(Y ; A1 + A2)Eq.(1).
When we additionally impose the secrecy for each message
to the receiver R, this task is called secure computation-
and-forward. In this case, it is required that the receiver R
obtains the modulo sum M1 + M2, but the variable in R’s
hand is independent of M1 and M2. The papers [10], [11],
[12], [13], [14] proposed a code for this task by using lattice
code. Using an arbitrary algebraic code for computation-
and-forward given in [21], [22], the paper [15] proposed an
efficiently realizable code. The paper [15] also derived an
upper bound for the leaked information of the constructed
finite length code. Also, the paper [15] showed that the rate
2I(Y ; A1 + A2)Eq.(1) − I(Y ; A1, A2)Eq.(1) is achievable in the
BPSK scheme [15, (29)], where the mutual information is
given with the independent and uniform random numbers
A1 and A2. That is, when the channel (1) is prepared and
the receiver colludes with no sender, secure computation-and-
forward guarantees no information leakage of each message to
the receiver while the receiver can recover the sum M1 + M2.
In fact, all these papers [10], [11], [12], [13], [14] for secure
computation-and-forward addressed only the case when the
number of senders is 2. The paper [23] will address secure
computation-and-forward when the number of senders is more
than 2.
Unfortunately, we have no good application for secure
computation-and-forward except for secure two way-relay
channel with untrusted relay. The remaining part of this paper
discusses its further application.
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Fig. 2. Butterfly network coding.
III. BUTTERFLY NETWORK
A. conventional protocol
We consider butterfly network coding [16], which is a
coding method that efficiently transmits the information in
the crossing way as Fig. 2. The aim of this network is the
following two tasks. The transmission of the message M1 from
V1 to V6 and the transmission of the message M2 from V2 to V5.
When each channel can transmit only one element of Fq, the
channel e3 from V3 to V4 is the bottleneck. In this network,
only the node V3 has the choice because other node has no
other choice except for transmitting the received information.
To resolve this bottleneck, the node V3 transmits the modulo
sum to the node V4 via channel e3. Then, the sink node V5
can recover the message M2 from the received information M1
and M1+M2. Similarly, the other sink node V6 can recover the
message M1 from the received information M2 and M1 + M2.
B. Secure network coding
However, under this network code, the node V3 obtains
both messages M1 and M2. The sink node V5 obtains the
intended message M1, and the other sink node V6 has the same
problem. Now, we consider impose the secrecy for the attack
to one of intermediate nodes. That is, the information of all
intermediate nodes needs to be independent of M1 and M2, and
the information of source node V5 (V6) needs to be independent
of the unintended message M1 (M2). This kind of secrecy can
be realized by employing a shared secret number L between
V1 and V2 when messages M1 and M2 are elements of Fq and
q is not a power of 2 in the following way [24, Figure 2].
3When the information transmitted Zi on the edge ei is given
as
Z1 = 2M1 + L, Z4 = −(M1 + L),
Z2 = 2M2 + L, Z7 = −(M2 + L),
Z3 = Z1 + Z2 = 2M1 + 2M2 + 2L,
Z5 = Z6 = Z3/2,
Mˆ2 = Z5 + Z4 = M2, Mˆ1 = Z6 + Z7 = M1,
where Mˆ2 (Mˆ1) is the recovered message by V5 (V6). Any
intermediate edge and any intermediate node obtain no infor-
mation for the messages M1 and M2. Also, the sink node V5
(V6) obtains no information for the message M1 (M2) while
it obtains the message M2 (M1). Hence, this code guarantees
the following types of security; (B1) When the eavesdropper
attacks only one of edges, she obtains no information for
the messages M1 and M2. (B2) When no node colludes
with another node, each node obtains no information for the
unintended messages.
When q ≥ 4 is a power of 2, the above code can be modified
as follows. We choose an element e ∈ Fq such that e
2
+ e , 0,
i.e., e , 1, 0. Then, we arrange our code as
Z1 = (1 + e)M1 + L, Z4 = −(M1 + L),
Z2 = (1 + e)M2 + eL, Z7 = −(M2 + L),
Z3 = Z1 + Z2 = (1 + e)(M1 + M2 + L),
Z5 = Z6 = Z3/(1 + e),
Mˆ2 = Z5 + Z4 = M2, Mˆ1 = Z6 + Z7 = M1.
This modification realizes the required security in this case.
C. Secure physical layer network coding
But, if there is no shared secret number between V1 and V2,
it is not so easy to realize this kind of secrecy for the butterfly
network under the framework of secure network coding. Now,
we assume the assumption; (B3) The pairs (e1, e2), (e4, e5),
and (e6, e7) are given as multiple access Gaussian channels like
(1). Only the channel e3 is a single input Gaussian channel.
In this case, in the multiple access Gaussian channel (e1, e2)
at V3, we employ secure computation-and-forward so that the
node V3 obtains the information M1 + M2. Then, the node
V3 forwards the obtained information to the node V4, and
the node V4 receives the information M4 := M1 + M2. In
the multiple access Gaussian channel (e4, e5) at V5, we again
employ secure computation-and-forward so that the node V5
obtains the information M4 − M1 = M2. In the same way, the
node V6 obtains the information M4 − M2 = M1. That is, this
code guarantees the following types of security; (B4) When
no node colludes with another node and (B3) is satisfied, each
node obtains no information for the unintended messages.
As another kind of secure physical layer network coding,
we attach the computation-and-forward to the communications
to nodes V3, V5, and V6 in the protocol with q = 4 given in
Section III-B. In this protocol, an element of F4 is regarded
as a vector on F2. While this protocol saves the time, it still
requires the secure shared randomness L. This protocol can be
regarded as a simple combination of secure network coding
and physical layer network coding.
D. Comparison
To implement these protocols as wireless communication
network, we compare the transmission speeds of the protocols
given in Sections III-B and III-C when each edge is given as
the BPSK scheme of a two-input Gaussian channel as (1) or
a single-input Gaussian channel
Y = hX + Z, (2)
where h ∈ C are the channel fading coefficients, Z is a Gaus-
sian complex random variable with average 0 and variance 1,
and X is coded as (−1)A with A ∈ F2. In this comparison,
for simplicity, we assume that h1 = h2 = h. Here, we assume
that T is the time period to transmitting one Gaussian signal
in each edge. Additionally, we assume that ideal codes are
available as follows. The mutual information rate I(Y ; A)Eq.(2)
is available in the channel (2), the rate I(Y ; A1 + A2)Eq.(1)
is available for computation-and-forward in the channel (1),
and the rate 2I(Y ; A1 + A2)Eq.(1) − I(Y ; A1, A2)Eq.(1) is avail-
able for secure computation-and-forward in the channel (1).
Notice that the relation I(Y ; A2 |A1)Eq.(1) = I(Y ; A1 |A2)Eq.(1)
holds in this case. Also, the mutual information rate pair
(I(Y ; A1 A2)Eq.(1)/2, I(Y ; A1 A2)Eq.(1)/2) is available in the MAC
channel (1) when both senders intend to send their own
message to the receiver. In the above discussion, the random
variables A1, A2, and A are subject to the uniform distribution
independently.
Secure network coding protocol given in Section III-B needs
to avoid a crossed line when we do not use multiple access
Gaussian channel. Hence, its whole network needs four time
slots at least as Table I. Therefore, to transmit message with
size eR , the required time in this case is calculated to be
4RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
.
TABLE I
SECURE NETWORK CODING WITHOUT MULTIPLE ACCESS GAUSSIAN
CHANNEL
Time slot Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4
Channel e1, e4 e2, e7 e3 e5, e6
When we use multiple access Gaussian channel, secure
network coding protocol given in Section III-B can be realized
with three time slots as Table II. In this case, to transmit
message with size eR, the required time is calculated to be
2RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
+
2RT
I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
. Although we can design the whole
process as Table III, this design requires the time length
RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
+
4RT
I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
, which is larger than 2RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
+
2RT
I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
because
I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
2
≤ I(Y ; A)Eq.(2).
Secure physical layer network coding protocol given in
the 1st paragraph of Section III-C can be realized only with
three time slots as in Table III, where the pairs (e1, e2),
(e4, e5), and (e6, e7) are realized by secure computation-and-
forward based on the Gaussian MAC channel (1). Therefore,
to transmit message with size eR, the required time in this case
is calculated to be 2RT
2I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)−I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
+
RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
.
4TABLE II
SECURE NETWORK CODING WITH MULTIPLE ACCESS GAUSSIAN CHANNEL
Time slot Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
Channel (e1, e2) e3, e4, e7 e5, e6
(ei, e j ) expresses a multiple access Gaussian channel of the joint transmission
on the edges ei and e j .
Secure physical layer network coding protocol given in the
2nd paragraph of Section III-C also can be realized only with
three time slots as in Table III. Therefore, to transmit message
with size eR, the required time in this case is calculated to be
2RT
I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)
+
RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
.
TABLE III
SECURE PHYSICAL LAYER NETWORK CODING WITH MULTIPLE ACCESS
GAUSSIAN CHANNEL
Time slot Time 1 Time 2 Time 3
Channel (e1, e2) e3 (e4, e5),(e6, e7)
Fig. 3 gives the numerical comparison among 4RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
,
2RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
+
2RT
I (Y ;A1,A2 )Eq.(1)
, 2RT
2I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)−I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
+
RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
, and 2RT
I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)
+
RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
. Secure network
coding protocol given in Section III-B requires shorter time
length for the transmission than secure physical layer network
coding protocol given in Section III-C in this comparison.
Since the difference is not so extensive, secure physical layer
network coding protocol given in the first paragraph of Section
III-C is useful when it is not easy to prepare secure shared
randomness between two source nodes. In fact, when we use
the butterfly network, it is usual that the direct communication
between two source nodes is not easy. In this case, such a se-
cure shared randomness requires an additional cost. However,
secure physical layer network coding protocol given in the
second paragraph of Section III-C has no advantage over the
secure network coding protocol with MAC channel. That is,
a simple combination of secure network coding and physical
layer network coding is not so useful in this case.
IV. NETWORK WITH THREE SOURCES
Next, we consider the network given in Fig 4. This network
has three source nodes S1, S2, and S3, three intermediate nodes
I1, I2, and I3, and one terminal node T . The aim of this
network is secure transmission from the three source nodes
to the terminal node T . The source node Si intends to transmit
an element Mi ∈ Fq to the terminal node T .
A. Secure network coding
First, we consider this network with the framework of secure
network coding. Each edge expresses a channel to transmit one
element of Fq without error. We consider two settings.
(1) Eve can eavesdrop one edge among three edges
between the intermediate nodes and the terminal
node.
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
0
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Fig. 3. Transmission Time for four schemes when RT = 1. Upper solid line
(Black) expresses the time 2RT
2I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)−I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
+
RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
of secure physical layer network coding protocol given in the 1st paragraph
of Section III-C. Upper dashed line (Blue) expresses the time 4RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
of
secure network coding protocol given in Section III-B without MAC channel.
Lower dashed line (Red) expresses the time 2RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
+
2RT
I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
of
secure network coding protocol given in Section III-B with MAC channel.
Lower solid line (Green) expresses the time 2RT
I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)
+
RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
of secure physical layer network coding protocol given in the 2nd paragraph
of Section III-C.
(2) Eve can eavesdrop one intermediate node among
three intermediate nodes.
1) Case (1): The following code is secure in the case
(1) when q is not a power of 2. Notice that the matrix
©­
«
0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0
ª®
¬
is invertible because
©­
«
−1/2 1/2 1/2
1/2 −1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2 −1/2
ª®
¬
is
the inverse matrix. Source node Si sends Mi in each edge. Each
intermediate node sends the sum of the received information.
Finally, applying the inverse matrix
©­
«
−1/2 1/2 1/2
1/2 −1/2 1/2
1/2 1/2 −1/2
ª®
¬
to the received information, the node T recovers all messages.
In this code, each of the messages M1 + M2, M2 + M3, and
M3+M1 is independent of anyone of M1, M2, and M3. Hence,
the security in the case (1) is satisfied. The rate of this protocol
is the optimal even without the secrecy condition.
Next, we consider the case when q ≥ 4 is a power of
2. We choose an element e ∈ Fq such that e
2
+ e , 0,
which implies that
©­
«
0 1 1
1 0 e
e e 0
ª®
¬
is invertible because its
determinant is e2 + e , 0. For example, when q = 4, since
e2 = e + 1, the inverse matrix is
©­
«
1 + e e e
1 + e e 1
e e 1
ª®
¬
. Then,
the following code is secure; Source node Si sends Mi in
each edge. The intermediate nodes I1, I2, and I3 send the
received information Z1 := M2 + M3, Z2 := M1 + eM3, and
Z3 := eM1 + eM2, respectively. Finally, applying the inverse
matrix of
©­
«
0 1 1
1 0 e
e e 0
ª®
¬
to the received information
©­
«
Z1
Z2
Z3
ª®
¬
,
the node T recovers all messages. In this code, each of the
5S2
S1
S3
I1
I2
I3
T
e1
e4
e5
e2
e3
e6
e7
e8
e9
M1
M2
M3
M1
M2
M3
Fig. 4. Network with three sources.
informations eM1+eM2, M2+M3, and eM3+M1 is independent
of anyone of M1, M2, and M3. Hence, the security in the case
(1) is satisfied. That is, this code guarantees the following type
of security; (T1) When the eavesdropper attacks only one of
edges, she obtains no information for anyone of the messages
M1, M2 and M3.
2) Case (2): In the case (2), the following code is secure.
We use the channels between the intermediate nodes and the
terminal node twice, but, we use the channels between the
source nodes and the intermediate nodes only once. Source
node Si prepares scramble variable Li . Source node Si sends
the scramble variable Li to the intermediate node Ii+1 via
the edge ei . Source node Si sends the variable Mi − Li to
Intermediate node Ii−1 via the edge e3+i . Here i + 1 and i − 1
are regarded as elements of Z3. Each intermediate node sends
both received variables to the terminal node by using the
channel twice. Since the terminal node T obtains information
L1, L2, L3, M1 − L1, M2 − L2, and M3 − L3, it can recover the
messages M1 = (M1 − L1) + L1, M2 = (M2 − L2) + L2, and
M3 = (M3−L3)+L3. The information on the intermediate node
Ii is the pair of Li+1 and Mi−1 − Li−1, which is independent of
anyone of M1, M2, and M3. Hence, this code guarantees the
following type of security; (T2) When no intermediate node
colludes with another node, each intermediate node obtains no
information for the messages.
B. Secure physical layer network coding
1) Use of secure computation-and-forward: Now, we as-
sume the assumption; (T3) The pairs (e1, e6), (e2, e4), and
(e3, e5) are given as multiple access Gaussian channels like
(1). We assume that the eavesdropper can access one of the
information on the intermediate nodes, which corresponds to
Case 2 of Section IV-A. Then, using secure computation-and-
forward, we construct a required protocol.
First, we consider the case when q is not a power of 2.
In the multiple access Gaussian channel (e1, e6), we employ
secure computation-and-forward so that the node I2 obtains
the information M1 + M3. Similarly, I1 and I3 obtain the
information M2+M3 and M1+M2, respectively. Therefore, the
information on each intermediate node is independent of the
messages M1, M2, and M3. In the next step, the intermediates
nodes I1, I2, and I3 transmit their obtained information M
′
1
,M ′
2
,
and M ′
3
to the terminal node T via the multiple access Gaussian
channels with three input signals. Then, applying separate
decoding, the terminal node T recovered the information
M ′
1
,M ′
2
, and M ′
3
. Using the method given in Section IV-A1,
the terminal node T obtains the original information M1,M2,
and M3.
When q ≥ 4 is a power of 2, to apply the method given in
Section IV-A1, the node I2 needs to obtain the information
M1 + eM3. It can be realized by secure computation-and-
forward with a 2-dimensional vector over the finite field F2
by the prior conversion from M3 to eM3 in the node S3 before
use of the multiple access Gaussian channel (e1, e6). The same
method is applied to the multiple access Gaussian channels
(e2, e4) and (e3, e5). Then, the remaining part can be done in
the same way as the above.
Therefore, under the framework of secure physical layer
network coding, we can realize the secure code for the attack
to an intermediate node by using secure computation-and-
forward. That is, this code guarantees the following types of
security; (T4) When no node colludes with another node and
(T3) is satisfied, each intermediate node obtains no information
for the messages. This code does not require additional random
number like the code given in Section IV-A2.
2) Use of computation-and-forward: Next, using
computation-and-forward, we construct a required protocol.
For this aim, we employ the protocol given in Section IV-A2.
In this protocol, at the node T , to recover M1 we employ
computation-and-forward of two edges e8 and e9. Similarly,
to recover M2 (M3), we employ computation-and-forward of
two edges e7 and e9 (e7 and e8).
C. Comparison
To implement these protocols as wireless communication
network, we compare the transmission speeds of the protocols
given in Sections IV-A and IV-B when each edge is given
as the BPSK scheme of a single-input Gaussian channel (2),
a two-input Gaussian channel (1), or a three-input Gaussian
channel (1)
Y = hX1 + hX2 + hX3 + Z, (3)
where h ∈ C are the channel fading coefficients, Z is a
Gaussian complex random variable with average 0 and
variance 1, and Xi is coded as (−1)
Ai with Ai ∈ F2. In this
comparison, we make the same assumptions for h1, h2, and
6T . Additionally, we assume that ideal codes given in Section
III-D are available, and that the mutual information rate triple
(I(Y ; A1 A2 A3)Eq.(3)/3, I(Y ; A1 A2 A3)Eq.(3)/3, I(Y ; A1 A2 A3)Eq.(3)/3)
is available in the MAC channel (3) when three senders
intend to send their own message to the receiver, where the
random variables A1, A2, and A3 are subject to the uniform
distribution independently. Under these assumptions, we
compare secure network coding protocol given in Section
IV-A2 and secure physical layer network coding protocol
given in Section IV-B because both protocols realize the
secrecy for intermediate nods.
When we do not use multiple access Gaussian channel.
secure network coding protocol given in Section IV-A2 needs
five time slots at least as Table IV. In particular, the edges e7,
e8, and e9 need to send twice information as the remaining
edges. Therefore, to transmit message with size eR, the re-
quired time in this case is calculated to be 8RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
. When we
use multiple access Gaussian channel, secure network coding
protocol given in Section IV-A2 can be realized with two
time slots as Table V. In this case, to transmit message with
size eR , the required time in this case is calculated to be
6RT
I (Y ;A1A2A3)Eq.(3)
+
2RT
I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
.
TABLE IV
SECURE NETWORK CODING WITHOUT MULTIPLE ACCESS GAUSSIAN
CHANNEL
Time span Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 Time 5
Channel e1, e2, e3 e4, e5, e6 e7 e8 e9
TABLE V
SECURE NETWORK CODING WITH MULTIPLE ACCESS GAUSSIAN CHANNEL
Time span Time 1 Time 2
Channel (e1, e6), (e2, e4),(e3, e5) (e7, e8, e9)
Secure physical layer network coding protocol given in
Section IV-B1 can be realized only with two time slots as
in Table VI, where the pairs (e1, e2), (e4, e5), and (e6, e7)
are realized by secure computation-and-forward based on the
Gaussian MAC channel (1). Therefore, to transmit message
with size eR, the required time in this case is calculated to be
3RT
I (Y ;A1A2A3)Eq.(3)
+
RT
2I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)−I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
.
TABLE VI
SECURE PHYSICAL LAYER NETWORK CODING WITH SECURE
COMPUTATION-AND-FORWARD
Time span Time 1 Time 2
Channel (e1, e6), (e2, e4), (e3, e5) (e7, e8, e9)
Another secure physical layer network coding protocol
given in Section IV-B2 can be realized only with two time slots
as in Table VII, where the pairs (e1, e2), (e4, e5), and (e6, e7)
are realized by secure computation-and-forward based on the
Gaussian MAC channel (1). Therefore, to transmit message
with size eR , the required time in this case is calculated to be
3RT
I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)
+
2RT
I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
.
TABLE VII
SECURE PHYSICAL LAYER NETWORK CODING WITH
COMPUTATION-AND-FORWARD
Time span Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4
Channel (e1, e6), (e2, e4),(e3, e5) (e8, e9) (e7, e9) (e7, e8)
Fig. 5 gives the numerical comparison among
3RT
I (Y ;A1A2A3)Eq.(3)
+
RT
2I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)−I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
, 3RT
I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)
+
2RT
I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
, 8RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
, and 6RT
I (Y ;A1A2A3)Eq.(3)
+
2RT
I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
.
Codes of secure physical layer network coding protocol
given in Section IV-B require shorter time length for the
transmission than secure network coding protocol given in
Section IV-A2 in this comparison when the coefficient h is
larger than about 1.7. This comparison shows the advantage
of the secure physical layer network coding protocol given
in Section IV-B1 over the secure network coding protocol
given in Section IV-A2. Also, this comparison indicates
the advantage of the simple combination of secure network
coding and physical layer network coding given in Section
IV-B2 over the secure network coding protocol given in
Section IV-A2 with MAC channel.
1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
h
Transmission Time
Fig. 5. Transmission Time for four schemes when RT = 1. Solid line (Black)
expresses the time 3RT
I (Y ;A1 A2 A3)Eq.(3)
+
RT
2I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)−I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
of
secure physical layer network coding protocol given in Section IV-B1. Solid
line (Green) expresses the time 3RT
I (Y ;A1+A2)Eq.(1)
+
2RT
I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
of secure
physical layer network coding protocol given in Section IV-B2. Upper dashed
line (Blue) expresses the time 8RT
I (Y ;A)Eq.(2)
of secure network coding protocol
given in Section IV-A2 without MAC channel. Lower dashed line (Red)
expresses the time 6RT
I (Y ;A1 A2 A3)Eq.(3)
+
2RT
I (Y ;A1,A2)Eq.(1)
of secure network
coding protocol given in Section IV-A2 with MAC channel. Solid line (Black),
Solid line (Green), and Lower dashed line (Red) intersect aroundh = 1.7.
V. CONCLUSION
We have discussed the advantages of secure physical layer
network coding over secure network coding. To clarify this
advantage, we have addressed two typical networks. One is
7the butterfly network (Fig 2), and the other is a network with
three source nodes (Fig. 4). That is, we have given a concrete
protocol that efficiently works on these examples. We have
also compared transmission times of proposed codes.
In these examples, secure physical layer network coding
can realize the secrecy against intermediate nodes. Therefore,
we can consider that secure physical layer network coding is
useful when we realize the secrecy against intermediate nodes.
In fact, when adversary attacks an intermediate node secure
network coding requires more randomness than when adver-
sary attacks an edge. Further, there are still a small number of
applications of secure physical layer network coding. Hence,
it is a future study to find more fruitful applications of secure
physical layer network coding.
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